The design of international tax policies, regarding whether and how to tax corporate incomes earned in foreign countries, has received a great deal of attention from policymakers and economists. Japan's worldwide tax system taxed foreign source income upon repatriation. To stimulate dividend repatriations from Japanese-owned foreign a¢ liates, Japan introduced a foreign dividend exemption in 2009 that exempts from home taxation dividends remitted by Japanese-owned foreign a¢ liates to their parent …rms. This paper examines the e¤ect of dividend exemption on pro…t repatriations by Japanese multinationals. We …nd no evidence that the dividend exemption system stimulated dividend repatriations of the typical foreign a¢ liate that had paid no dividends under the worldwide tax system. However, the responses of Japanese multinationals to dividend exemption were heterogeneous. Foreign a¢ liates with a large stock of retained earnings increased dividend payments more than other a¢ liates with the enactment of dividend exemption in 2009, but the increase in dividend payments was not associated with foreign tax rates.
Introduction
In an increasingly globalized world, the design of international tax policies, regarding whether and how to tax corporate incomes earned in foreign countries by multinational …rms, has received a great deal of attention from policymakers and economists in advanced countries. While taxing foreign source income would raise revenue, international tax rules signi…cantly in ‡uence the business activities of multinational corporations, including the location of foreign direct investment, income reallocation (income shifting) through transfer pricing, and pro…t repatriation. The United States taxes foreign income upon repatriation, allowing foreign tax credits for corporate income taxes and other related taxes paid to foreign governments under the so-called worldwide income tax system. In contrast to a worldwide income tax system, a territorial tax system exempts foreign income from home taxation; such systems are employed by many advanced countries, including Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands. 1 In the United States, policymakers and economists have long discussed changing the current worldwide tax system to a territorial tax system. Japan, the focus of this study, had a worldwide income tax system until the end of March 2009. At that time, the Japanese government was concerned that under the worldwide tax system, Japanese multinational corporations retained abroad a large portion of foreign pro…ts earned by their a¢ liates and did not repatriate them to Japan. Japanese …rms arguably had incentive to do so because their foreign incomes were taxed at high rates (as high as 40 percent) upon such repatriation. 2 To stimulate dividend repatriations from Japanese-owned foreign a¢ liates, Japan introduced a permanent foreign dividend exemption in April 2009 and exempted from home taxation dividends remitted by foreign a¢ liates to their Japanese parent …rms. Thus, with the introduction of the dividend exemption system, the Japanese corporate tax system moved to a territorial tax system. This paper examines the e¤ect of dividend exemption on pro…t repatriations by Japanese multinationals. Using a¢ liate-level data, we investigate whether the switch to the dividend exemption system increased the amount of dividend payments by foreign a¢ liates, as the Japanese government expected, and whether the responsiveness of dividend remittances to foreign tax rates (corporate income taxes and withholding income taxes on repatriated dividends) was changed by the adoption of the dividend exemption system. Few studies have empirically tested the e¤ects of a "permanent" dividend exemption and examined the actual outcomes of changing the regime from a worldwide tax system to a territorial tax system. 3 Egger et al. (2011) study foreign dividend exemption enacted in the tax reform of the United Kingdom in 2009 and …nd that foreign a¢ liates owned by U.K. multinational …rms responded to the tax reform by increasing dividend payments to their owners. Tajika et al. (2012) investigate the impact of Japan's dividend exemption on dividends received by Japanese parent …rms from their foreign subsidiaries. They …nd that more parent …rms, especially those facing greater demand for cash, increased dividends received from their foreign a¢ liates in response to the enactment of dividend exemption in 2009. 4 Unlike Tajika et al. (2012) , this paper studies the e¤ect of dividend exemption on dividend payments at the a¢ liate level and the responsiveness of dividend payments to repatriation tax costs. Each foreign a¢ liate faced a di¤erent tax cost of paying dividends to its parent …rm in Japan under the worldwide tax system, depending on the corporate tax payments to the host country and the withholding tax payments on dividends. Thus, the advantage of our study is that we can utilize the variations in the tax costs of dividend repatriations among a¢ liates to identify the impact of the tax reform on dividend repatriations. We use the micro database of the annual survey conducted by the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry of Japan (METI), The Survey of Overseas Business Activities. The survey provides information on the …nancial and operating characteristics of Japanese …rms operating abroad, including dividends paid to Japanese investors. We analyze the data from 2007 to 2009 to focus on the …rst-year response of Japanese multinationals to the dividend exemption system, noting that the …rst-year response is likely to be di¤erent from that in subsequent years for two reasons. First, as we will explain in detail in the next section, most Japanese multinationals expected the introduction of the dividend exemption system before the end of the 2008 accounting year. Thus, they might have reduced dividend repatriations in 2008 in anticipation of the adoption of the dividend exemption system and increase them in 2009. Second, some …rms may have repatriated as a one-time choice in 2009 large amounts of foreign income that they had retained and accumulated over a long period to avoid taxation in Japan.
We …nd that Japanese corporate taxes had a signi…cant negative e¤ect on dividend repatriations before 2009 under the worldwide income tax system. Despite the dividend exemption system substantially eliminating corporate tax liabilities on repatriated dividends in Japan, our analysis of the survey data provides no evidence that the dividend exemption system stimulated dividend repatriations of the typical foreign a¢ liate that had paid no dividends under the worldwide tax system. However, the response of Japanese multinationals to dividend exemption was heterogeneous. Foreign a¢ liates that had retained and accumulated large pro…ts under the worldwide tax system increased dividend payments more than other a¢ liates with the enactment of dividend exemption in 2009. Therefore, dividend exemption ful…lled the main aim to stimulate dividend repatriations from foreign a¢ liates with a large stock of retained earnings in line with the expectation of the Japanese government.
Surprisingly, we …nd no evidence that the responsiveness of dividend repatriations to foreign tax rates changed with the enactment of dividend exemption. More precisely, the increase in dividend payments was not associated with either the grossed-up tax rate difference between Japan and foreign countries, or the withholding tax rates on repatriated dividends. The Japanese government was concerned that adopting a territorial tax system may facilitate tax avoidance by multinational corporations shifting foreign income to low tax countries. Though it might take more time for companies to change their tax strategies in response to the tax reform, our results suggest that Japanese parent …rms did not immediately respond to dividend exemptions by reallocating their foreign pro…ts to their foreign a¢ liates in low tax countries and increasing dividend repatriations by those a¢ liates in 2009.
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section describes the background and the provisions of dividend exemption enacted in Japan. Section 3 calculates the tax costs of remitting pro…ts from foreign subsidiaries to their parent …rms in Japan by dividends, royalties or interest, and shows how Japanese dividend exemption has changed the tax costs of pro…t repatriations. Section 4 describes the data we use. Section 5 presents empirical results from our preliminary analysis regarding the …rst-year response of Japanese multinationals to dividend exemption. Section 6 extends the empirical model in Section 5 to analyze the heterogeneity of the responses to dividend exemption depending on the size of the stock of retained earnings of foreign a¢ liates. Section 7 present the results of robustness tests and alternative speci…cations. Section 8 concludes. 3 
The Dividend Exemption System Enacted in Japan in 2009
In May 2008, a subcommittee on international taxation at METI began to discuss the introduction of a dividend exemption in the corporate tax reform for 2009; this was publicly known because newspaper articles reported this development at the time. 6 In August 2008, the subcommittee released an interim report and proposed introducing a dividend exemption (METI, 2008) . In the report, METI estimated that the stock of retained earnings of Japanese-owned foreign a¢ liates was 17 trillion Japanese yen as of 2006. 7 Their concern was that an excessive amount of pro…t was retained in foreign countries to avoid home-country taxation in Japan, which distorted the decisions of Japanese corporations on the timing of pro…t repatriations and reduced domestic R&D investment that could be …nanced from foreign-source income. In November 2008, the Tax Commission also recommended the introduction of a dividend exemption system. Finally, this regime change was included in the legislation of the 2009 tax reform. The legislation was passed into law on March 27, 2009 and came into e¤ect on April 1, 2009. 8 The dividend exemption system permits Japanese resident corporations to deduct from taxable income 95 percent of dividends received from foreign a¢ liates in accounting years commencing on or after April 1, 2009. The rest (…ve percent) of the dividends are regarded as expenses incurred by parent …rms for earning the dividends and are added to the calculation of their taxable incomes in Japan. 9 In order to qualify for dividend exemption, a parent …rm must have held at least 25 percent of the shares of its a¢ liate for at least six months as of the dividend declaration date. While dividend exemption would reduce corporate tax liabilities on repatriated dividends in Japan, foreign tax credits no longer apply to withholding taxes on repatriated dividends imposed by host countries. The new system is still quite distant from pure source-based taxation. As the term "dividend"exemption suggests, it only exempts foreign income in the form of paid dividends 6 The discussion of Japan's foreign dividend exemption in this section largely draws on Aoyama (2009) and Masui (2010) . 7 Seventeen trillion yen are worth about 15 billion U.S. dollars at the 2006 exchange rate of 1 USD = 116.299 JPY (UNCTAD, 2012). 8 The subcommittee also examined the possibility of introducing a one-time dividend exemption similar to the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, limiting the use of dividends exempted from home taxation. However, the subcommittee concluded that a one-time dividend exemption would stimulate dividend repatriations only during the period under the exemption rule and would have an aftere¤ect that would counteract the e¤ect of dividend exemption. They were also concerned that limiting the use of exempted dividends would distort the managerial decisions and undermine managerial e¢ ciency of Japanese corporations (METI, 2008) . 9 The expenses corresponding to the …ve percent of the repatriated dividends are assumed to be deducted from the taxable incomes of parent …rms when they invest in their subsidiaries, and thus, would not be exempted upon repatriation under the new exemption system. 4 and does not apply to other types of foreign source income, including royalties, interest payments, income earned by foreign branches, and capital gains. Foreign taxes imposed on those income types continue to be creditable under the direct foreign tax credit system in Japan.
Finally, because this paper focuses on the …rst-year response to dividend exemption, the di¤erence between Japan's foreign dividend exemption enacted under the 2009 tax reform and the dividend tax deduction under the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 (AJCA) is also noteworthy. First, while the AJCA provides U.S. multinational corporations with a special one-time deduction of 85 percent of dividends received from their foreign a¢ liates, Japan's dividend exemption is permanent. Second, under the AJCA, the 85 percent exemption applies only to "extraordinary dividends,"which are de…ned as dividend payments exceeding average repatriations over a …ve-year period ending before July 1, 2003, excluding the highest and lowest years. 10 Therefore, the exemption is limited to a part of dividends paid (extraordinary dividends), and U.S. multinationals could claim the exemption only if they received foreign dividends more than the average amount. On the other hand, Japan's dividend exemption applies to 95 percent of all dividends as long as the conditions described above are satis…ed. 11 Thus, we note that the exemption permitted under the new tax system in Japan is quite di¤erent from and more generous than the exemption under the AJCA in the United States.
3 How Dividend Exemption A¤ects Pro…t Repatriations of Japanese Multinationals Hartman (1985) demonstrated that under certain conditions, repatriation taxes do not a¤ect the decisions on marginal investment and dividend payments made by "mature"subsidiaries that …nance their marginal investment out of their own retained earnings. However, this result depends on the assumption that repatriation tax rates are constant over time. This assumption could fail to hold because repatriation tax rates on dividends change depending on the foreign tax credit positions of parent …rms under a worldwide income tax system and the de…nition of taxable income (tax bases) in host countries.
12 10 In addition, to be eligible for the dividends-received deduction, dividends must be paid in cash and invested in approved activities in the United States, although this requirement may not be binding for U.S. multinationals (Blouin and Krull, 2009; and Dharmapala et al., 2011) . 11 The Japanese government estimates that given the requirements described above, more than 95 percent of foreign a¢ liates would be eligible for dividend exemption. 12 There is evidence that repatriation taxes discourage dividend payouts of U.S. corporations (Hines and Hubbard, 1990; Grubert, 1998; Desai et al., 2001 ). In contrast, using Japanese a¢ liate-level data, Tajika
In addition to those cases, repatriation tax rates also vary because of changes in the international tax regime. As we discussed in the previous section, Japanese …rms learned at the latest in May 2008 that the government was discussing the introduction of a dividend exemption. Thus, they could expect the tax regime change before the end of the 2008 accounting year, and some …rms may have expected it even earlier. In this situation, as we show in the appendix, even mature foreign a¢ liates would increase dividend payments to their parent …rms in response to a decrease in the repatriation tax rate due to the enactment of dividend exemption.
In what follows, we calculate the tax costs of remitting pro…ts from foreign subsidiaries to their parent …rms in Japan by dividends, royalties, or interest, given their decisions on foreign direct investment and show how Japan's dividend exemption has changed the tax costs of pro…t repatriations. We will then make predictions for our empirical analysis based on the changes in the repatriation tax costs.
To consider tax liabilities on foreign dividends under Japan's worldwide tax system (before April 2009) and the new exemption system (after April 2009), we calculate the tax costs of remitting an additional dollar of foreign income to Japan by dividends, royalties or interest. Let Y ijc denote the pre-tax pro…t of a¢ liate i operating in country c owned by parent j and T ijc the foreign corporate income tax paid by subsidiary i. We de…ne the average subsidiary tax rate as ijc = T ijc =Y ijc . Denote the statutory corporate tax rate of Japan and country c by H and c , respectively. The withholding tax rates on dividends, royalties, and interest payments are w Under the worldwide tax system in Japan before April 2009, the tax liability of parent j to receive one dollar of dividends from its own a¢ liate i in country c depends on the excess foreign tax credit position of parent j: whether the parent is in a situation of excess limit or excess credit. A parent …rm whose foreign tax payments are less than the foreign tax credit limit, where the foreign tax credit limit is calculated as the total foreign taxable income times the Japanese corporate tax rate, is referred to as being in excess limit. In contrast, if the foreign tax payments are greater than the foreign tax credit limit, the parent is referred to as being in excess credit and can use excess foreign tax credits -the di¤erence between the foreign tax payments and the foreign tax credit limit -to reduce the Japanese tax obligations on foreign source income in the next three years.
Suppose parent …rm j is in excess limit. Then it could claim foreign tax credits for the taxes paid to host country c when a¢ liate i remits one dollar of dividends. The dollar of dividends would be deemed as 1= ( . Parent i can also claim foreign tax credits for the taxes paid to country c: the corporate tax payment ijc =(1 ijc ) and the withholding tax on the dollar of dividends w D c . Thus, the net tax payment of parent j to receive one dollar of dividends from its a¢ liate i in country c can be written as P ijc such that
which is the di¤erence between the Japanese statutory tax rate and the subsidiary average tax rate grossed up by the subsidiary average tax rate. If parent j is in an excess credit position, the parent can use excess foreign tax credits to wipe out the Japanese corporate tax liability. 13 Then the net tax payment is w D c . In sum, the tax costs of remitting one dollar of dividends can be written as
if parent j is in excess credit.
After the introduction of the dividend exemption system (after April 2009), parent j can exclude 95 percent of dividends from its taxable income and has to include only …ve percent of the dividends in taxable income. Thus, the net tax payment to receive the dollar of dividends from a¢ liate i, or the repatriation tax rate under the new exemption system, is
Therefore, if parent j is in an excess limit position, the dividend exemption system eliminates almost the entire corporate tax liability in Japan. 14 The repatriation tax cost of repatriating dividends decreases from ( H ijc )=(1 ijc ) to 0:05 H when controlling for the withholding tax rate on dividends w D c . 15 On the other hand, because the withholding taxes on dividends are no longer creditable under the dividend exemption system, parent i 13 Even when parent j is in an excess credit position, the foreign tax credit that parent j can claim is limited up to the Japanese tax liability on the dollar of dividends ( H =(1 ijc )). 14 We note that most Japanese corporations are expected to be in excess limit positions because of the relatively high corporate tax rate of Japan. In the data from 2007 to 2009, only 6.9 percent of foreign a¢ liates faced average tax rates higher than the Japanese corporate tax rate. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that most parent …rms are in excess limit situations or that even if they are in excess credit, they do not have ssubstatial excess foreign tax credits. 15 In this section, we assume When the repatriation tax costs decrease to 0:05 H (controlling for w D c ), which is the same for all …rms, foreign a¢ liates will increase dividend payments under the new exemption system as long as repatriation taxes are a binding constraint on their dividend payout decisions. In addition, Japanese multinationals face di¤erent repatriation tax costs depending on their foreign tax credit positions and the corporate tax policies of the host countries. Because dividend exemption eliminates Japanese corporate tax liability on repatriated dividends (P ijc ), dividend payments should become less sensitive to the di¤erence between the Japanese statutory tax rate and the subsidiary average tax rate grossed up by the subsidiary average tax rate (P ijc ) after 2009. In other words, when we measure dividend payments as a fraction of a¢ liate sales to control for the …rm size, foreign a¢ liates in lower-tax countries (higher P ijc ) should pay more dividends scaled by sales than other a¢ liates under the exemption system. Therefore, we expect the following e¤ects of dividend exemption on pro…t repatriations by Japanese multinationals:
H1: Dividend repatriations from foreign a¢ liates increase when controlling for the withholding tax rate on dividends.
H2: Foreign a¢ liates in lower-tax countries (higher P ijc ) should pay more dividends scaled by sales than other a¢ liates.
16
H3: Dividend payments become more sensitive to the withholding tax rates on dividends.
While the dividend exemption system substantially changes the tax costs of repatriating foreign dividends, it does not change the tax treatments of repatriated royalties and interest payments at all. Consider the tax costs of remitting one dollar of a royalty or interest from a¢ liate i to its parent j. Because they are deductible payments, remitting an additional dollar as a royalty or interest will reduce the corporate tax payment in country c by c . The corporate tax liability on the dollar of deductible payments is H . Parent j also has to remit to the government of country c the withholding tax on one dollar of a royalty w R c or on the dollar of interest w I c . 16 Under the Japanese worldwide tax system, foreign tax credits apply to dividends paid by foreign subsidiaries directly owned by Japanese parent …rms and their second-tier subsidiaries (sub-subsidiaries). Our data has information on dividend paid by foreign subsidiaries owned by Japanese parents but does not have information on dividend indirectly paid by the second-tier subsidiaries through the …rst-tier subsidiaries. Therefore, the tax di¤erential P ijct could misrepresent the tax costs for dividends paid by …rst-tier foreign subsidiaries if a large portion of those dividends originally come from second-tier subsidiaries and if the second tier-subsidiaries face substantially di¤erent corporate tax rates in their host countries from those faced by the …rst-tier subsidiaries. In summary, regardless of the introduction of the dividend exemption system, the net tax costs of remitting one dollar of a royalty can be written as (
if parent j is in excess limit;
The net tax costs of remitting one dollar of interest payments can be written as (
As Grubert (1998) shows, those tax costs could a¤ect dividend repatriations to the extent that royalties and interest payments substitute or complement dividends as an alternative means of pro…t repatriations. In the following sections, we empirically examine how the response of dividend payments by Japanese-owned foreign a¢ liates to the repatriation tax costs changed due to the introduction of the dividend exemption regime and test hypotheses H1-H3.
Data
We use the micro database of the annual survey conducted by METI, The Survey of Overseas Business Activities. The main purpose of this survey is to obtain basic information on the business activities of foreign subsidiaries of Japanese …rms. The survey covers all Japanese …rms that owned a¢ liates abroad as of the end of the …scal year (March 31). A foreign a¢ liate of a Japanese …rm is de…ned as a …rm that is located in a foreign country in which the Japanese …rm had at least a 10 percent equity share. The survey provides data on the …nancial and operating characteristics of Japanese …rms operating abroad, including dividends and royalties paid to Japanese investors. Industrial classi…cation is available at the two-digit level.
To control for parent-…rm characteristics, we use another METI survey, The Basic Survey of Japanese Business Structure and Activities. This survey covers all …rms with 50 or more employees and capital or an investment fund of at least 30 million yen, for both manufacturing 9 and non-manufacturing industries. The survey provides data on the …nancial and operating characteristics of Japanese parent …rms.
We merge these two annual cross-section surveys to develop a longitudinal (panel) data set of foreign subsidiaries from 2007 to 2009. Each subsidiary is traced throughout the period using information such as parent and a¢ liate IDs as a key. 17 After dropping observations with missing dividend values, our panel from the METI surveys contains 27,713 observations of foreign a¢ liates from 2007 to 2009 with information on dividend payments available.
18 Table 1 19 We also note that the distribution of dividend payments is heavily skewed to the left. Most foreign a¢ liates paid no dividends (as detailed in Table 3 ).
=== Table 1 === Table 2 provides summary statistics of dividend payments by foreign a¢ liates scaled by their sales to control for the size of the a¢ liates and changes in foreign exchange rates. === Tables 2 and 3 ===   17 The parent ID is obtained from The Basic Survey of Japanese Business Structure and Activities. We also used the information on location and establishment year to trace each subsidiary. 18 Before 2007, the …rst METI survey collected dividend payments to Japanese investors every four years. 19 We cannot indicate the maximum and minimum values for the sake of maintaining the con…dentiality of the data. 20 The Japanese yen consistently appreciated over the period as follows: 1 USD = 118 JPY in 2007, 103 JPY in 2008, and 94 JPY in 2009 (UNCTAD, 2012). Thus, the increase in dividend repatriations could be undervalued as measured by Japanese yen without scaling.
In summary, while dividend payments at higher percentiles increased, the proportion of foreign a¢ liates paying dividends did not increase in 2009. This is suggestive of the heterogeneous response of Japanese multinationals to dividend exemption. Although the dividend exemption system may not stimulate pro…t repatriations from most foreign a¢ liates that had not paid dividends under the worldwide tax system, a small portion of …rms that had paid large amounts of dividends under the worldwide tax system may increase dividends paid further as a result of dividend exemption. Those observations motivate our regression analysis in the following sections by taking into account the possibility that the response of foreign a¢ liates to dividend exemption varies depending on the stock of retained earnings right before 2009.
Preliminary Analysis
To test our hypotheses H1-H3, we examine how the dividend exemption system a¤ected the repatriation behavior of Japanese multinational corporations and changed the responsiveness of repatriated dividends to repatriation taxes (corporate taxes and withholding taxes) in 2009. One limitation in our data set is that it does not include information on the foreign tax credit positions of parent …rms (excess limit or excess credit). Thus, we cannot identify the tax costs of remitting dividends for each a¢ liate based on its parent's credit position. However, as Grubert (1998) and Desai et al. (2001) point out, because companies are uncertain about their long-run credit positions and foreign tax credit positions are endogenous to repatriation behavior, adjusting the repatriation tax costs depending on parent foreign tax credit positions would also be problematic.
As a preliminary analysis of dividend repatriation patterns before and after the tax reform, our identi…cation strategy in this section employs a before-and-after comparison using a post-reform dummy variable. 21 We attempt to control for confounding factors that potentially a¤ect dividend payments (measured in Japanese yen), such as macroeconomic conditions, foreign exchange rates, tax policies of host countries, and parent …rm characteristics, as follows. First, we scale dividend payments by a¢ liate sales. Second, in our regression analysis described below, country-industry …xed e¤ects are included to control for systematic di¤erences in dividend payments across di¤erent industries and countries, which are possibly due to country-speci…c macroeconomic conditions over the entire data period. We also control for foreign exchange rates between Japanese yen and local currencies. To take into account demand for internal cash by parent …rms, we will control for the pro…tability and the total debt of parent …rms. 22 We estimate the following equation in the spirit of Grubert (1998):
where Dividend ijct is the dividend payments of a¢ liate i located in country c to its Japanese parent j divided by a¢ liate sales, in year t. The dummy variable DE t is equal to one if t = 2009 and equal to zero otherwise. This dummy variable and its interaction terms with the tax variables are intended to capture the changes in dividends paid and responsiveness of dividends to the tax variables. As de…ned in the previous section, P ijct is the grossed-up tax rate di¤erential between Japan and foreign country c. 23 The withholding tax rates of country c in year t on dividends, royalties, and interest payments are w 24 The statutory tax rate of country c in year t is ct . 25 The vector of other control variables are denoted as X ijct , including the exchange rate between Japanese yen 22 One may argue that we can create control and treatment groups using the information on …scal year end months of parent companies and employ a di¤erence-in-di¤erences estimation, noting that dividend exemption applies to dividends received by parent companies in the accounting years starting on or after April 1, 2009. This requirement implies that parent …rms whose accounting years end in March can apply for dividend exemption in the accounting years from 2009, while other …rms can do so in the accounting years from 2010. However, we cannot tell from the data exactly when foreign subsidiaries pay dividends to their parents in a year. In addition, if …scal year end months of parent companies are not March, their foreign subsidiaries should have an incentive to delay dividend payments so that the parents receive them in the accounting year of 2010 (but in the data period for 2009) and can claim exemption for those dividends. Therefore, it is di¢ cult to identify dividends that did not qualify for dividend exemption in the data for 2009. 23 To apply the gross-up calculation to P ijc = ( H ijc )=(1 ijc ) appropriately, we dropped observations with negative corporate tax payments (T ijct < 0). The average subsidiary tax rate ( ijc = T ijct =Y ijct ) is set to 0 if T ijct = 0 and Y ijct = 0, where Y ijct is the pre-tax pro…t of a¢ liate j, and is also set to 0.5 because foreign tax credits would apply up to 50% of foreign taxable income. 24 We collect information on withholding tax rates on dividends, royalties, and interest from the database of the Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO), J-FILE (http://www.jetro.go.jp/world/search/cost/). These data provide up-to-date information on the withholding tax rates of 75 countries for 2011. We also collect information on the withholding tax rates of 46-51 countries for 2007-2010 from the reports published by JETRO (http://www.jetro.go.jp/world/reports/). To supplement the information on the withholding tax rates for the countries that JETRO's data do not cover, in cases where Japan has tax treaties with these countries, we use the withholding tax rates determined in the tax treaties. We also obtain the information on the withholding tax rates from the Worldwide Corporate Tax Guide, which is published by Ernst & Young, and the Worldwide Tax Summaries, which is published by PricewaterhouseCoopers. Finally, our data contains information on the withholding tax rates of 96 countries from 2007 to 2009, which is used in our current analysis. 25 Data on statutory corporate income tax rates are obtained from the KPMG Corporate and Indirect Tax Survey 2011. The statutory tax rates include sub-central (statutory) corporate income tax rates. and the local currency in country c normalized to one at the level in 2005, lagged parent net pro…t scaled by total assets, lagged parent total debt scaled by total assets, country dummies, and industry dummies. To mitigate the in ‡uence of outliers, we winsorize all the scaled variables used in the analysis at the top and bottom one percent. Table 5 provides summary statistics for all of these variables before the winsorization.
=== Table 5 === From the hypotheses proposed in the previous section, we expect the signs of the key parameters to be as follows. If the dividend exemption system uniformly stimulated dividend repatriations by foreign a¢ liates of Japanese multinational …rms, the coe¢ cient on DE t would be estimated to be positive, as hypothesized in H1 ( 0 > 0). The coe¢ cient on P ijct is expected to be negative ( 1 < 0) because higher repatriation tax costs would discourage dividend payments under the worldwide tax system. If dividend payments became less sensitive to the tax rate di¤erential between Japan and foreign countries under the new exemption system as hypothesized in H2, the coe¢ cient on (DE t P ijct ) would be estimated to be positive ( 1 > 0). Another interpretation of H2 is that if dividend repatriations from lower-tax countries (high P ijct ) were discouraged under the worldwide tax system, foreign a¢ liates in these countries should pay more dividends scaled by sales than other a¢ liates when dividend exemption substantially eliminates the repatriation tax burden.
The coe¢ cient on w D ct is expected to be negative ( 2 < 0) because the tax price of dividends equals the withholding tax rate on dividends (w D ct ) if a parent …rm is in excess credit. If dividend repatriation becomes more sensitive to the withholding tax rates on dividends under the new exemption system, as hypothesized in H3, the coe¢ cient on (DE t w D ct ) would be estimated to be negative ( 2 < 0). The signs of the coe¢ cients on the withholding tax rates and the statutory tax rates would depend on how strongly dividends substitute for royalties or interest as an alternative means of pro…t repatriations.
We employ a Tobit procedure because most a¢ liates (72 percent of all a¢ liates in the sample) pay zero dividends, and thus, the dependent variable in equation (5) could be considered as a right-censored variable. We estimate the equation including country and industry …xed e¤ects to control for systematic di¤erence in dividend payments across di¤erent industries and countries, and thus use across-a¢ liate variations to identify the parameters. 26 . Table 5 presents the estimation results. The point estimates are marginal e¤ects on the latent dependent variable, which can be interpreted as a "desired" amount of dividend payments. 27 Notably, the estimated coe¢ cient on DE t is not positive and signi…cantly di¤erent from zero in any speci…cations. This suggests that the dividend exemption system did not increase dividend payments of the "typical" (or median) a¢ liate that did not pay dividends under the worldwide tax system. This result is inconsistent with hypothesis H1. The coe¢ cient on DE t , of course, could falsely attribute the change in dividend payments in 2009 due to unobserved macroeconomic factors or the relevant structural shift in the Japanese economy during the data period. 28 However, this result is still surprising because we had expected that multinational …rms demonstrate the largest response in the …rst year of the new exemption system by repatriating accumulated pro…ts in foreign countries.
=== Table 6 ===
The estimated coe¢ cient on the tax price of dividends (P ijct ) is negative and statistically di¤erent from zero at the one-percent level in all speci…cations. This suggests that the Japanese worldwide tax system signi…cantly discouraged dividend repatriations from foreign a¢ liates in low tax countries because dividend repatriations triggered an additional tax liability proportional to the di¤erence between Japanese and foreign tax rates under the worldwide tax system. However, the estimated coe¢ cient on (DE t P ijct ) is also negative in all speci…cations, which is inconsistent with hypothesis H2. This suggests that dividend payments did not become less sensitive to the tax rate di¤erential between Japan and foreign countries in the …rst year of the dividend exemption system. In other words, foreign a¢ liates in lower tax countries did not signi…cantly increase dividend payments to their parents more than other a¢ liates. The coe¢ cient on (DE t w D ct ) is estimated to be negative, which is consistent with hypothesis H3 but not signi…cant in either of speci…cations (3) and (4) .
In summary, we …nd no evidence that the dividend exemption system stimulated dividend repatriations of "typical"foreign a¢ liates as hypothesized in H1 and H2. There are caveats for interpreting the estimation results. First, one limitation of relying on the DE t dummy variable to measure the average change in the level of dividend payments of foreign a¢ liates is that the estimated coe¢ cient on DE t might falsely capture possible e¤ects of cyclical and secular macroeconomic trends on pro…t repatriations in spite of our attempt to control for those confounding factors by the various control variables described above. Second, as Tables 27 In our analysis, the key parameters of interest are the interaction terms of DE t and other tax variables. As Ai and Norton (2003) shows, the interaction e¤ect in nonlinear models is di¤erent from the marginal e¤ect of the interaction term. Therefore, in the estimation of our empirical models using a Tobit procedure, the marginal e¤ect of the interaction terms on the observed dividend payments (conditional on positive dividend payments) cannot be calculated in a normal manner. Thus, we focus on the marginal e¤ects on the latent variable for dividend payments, which is a linear function of independent variables. 28 Most notably, the …nancial crisis triggered by the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers severely hit the Japanese economy in 2008. 1 and 2 may imply, the response of foreign a¢ liates to dividend exemption is heterogeneous. Foreign a¢ liates that have larger payout capacity of dividends than other a¢ liates, for example those with a large stock of retained earnings, may have responded more ‡exibly to dividend exemption by increasing dividend payments to their parent …rms.
6 Heterogeneous Response to Dividend Exemption: By
Stock of Retained Earnings
As we described in Section 2, one of the main goals of dividend exemption is to stimulate dividend repatriations from foreign a¢ liates that had retained and accumulated large amounts of foreign pro…t to avoid home taxation in Japan. Foreign a¢ liates with a large stock of retained earnings are also expected to show a stronger response to dividend exemption because dividends are distributed from after-tax pro…ts and the stock of retained earnings. In this section, we study a heterogeneous response to dividend exemption depending on the size of retained earnings of foreign a¢ liates and examine whether foreign a¢ liates with a large stock of retained earnings in 2008 increased dividend payments in a manner consistent with our hypotheses H1 and H2.
We use information on the stock of retained earnings at the end of years 2007 and 2008 and construct a dummy variable equal to one if the stock of retained earnings scaled by sales is greater than the median value in the sample in the previous year, which is denoted as R ijct , where i is the index for the a¢ liate owned by parent …rm j. Table 7 
=== Table 7 ===
To take into account the heterogeneity of the response to dividend exemption in the regression equation, we estimate equation (5) Table 8 presents the estimation results. The coe¢ cient on DE t is still estimated to be negative as in Table 6 . The coe¢ cient on R ijct is signi…cantly positive, implying that foreign a¢ liates that had a large stock of retained earnings in the previous year paid more dividends in the next year. In addition, the coe¢ cient on (R ijct DE t ) is also signi…cantly positive. This suggests that a foreign a¢ liate with a larger stock of retained earnings in 2008 paid more dividends than other a¢ liates in 2009, which is consistent with hypothesis H1. 29 The estimated coe¢ cient on (T ij DE t ) in column (4) The coe¢ cients on (DE t P ijct ) and (R ijct DE t P ijct ) are not precisely estimated in speci…cations (3) and (4), although we expected that foreign a¢ liates with a large stock of retained earnings should pay more dividends than other a¢ liates in 2009 as the grossed-up tax di¤erential between Japan and the host country becomes larger. The coe¢ cient on (R ijct DE t w D ct ) is negative, which is consistent with our hypothesis H3, but is not signi…cantly di¤erent from zero. These results suggest that the changes in dividend payments in 2009 were not associated with foreign tax rates (corporate income tax rates and withholding tax rates on dividends), while the negative and signi…cant coe¢ cients on P ijct and w D ct imply that the tax costs on dividends discouraged dividend payments under the worldwide tax system. This may suggest that Japanese multinationals did not aggressively pursue the opportunity to reduce the repatriation tax cost by repatriating more incomes through foreign a¢ liates in low tax countries in 2009, or that they just did not enough time to change their tax strategies in the …rst year after the tax regime change.
31
In summary, the response of Japanese-owned a¢ liates to dividend exemption is heterogeneous depending on the size of the stock of retained earnings. Even though we could 29 To investigate whether foreign a¢ liates with a large stock of retained earnings increased desired dividend payments, we also tested whether the sum of the coe¢ cients on DE t and (R ijct DE t ) is positive and statistically di¤erent from zero. However, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the sum of these coe¢ cient is less than or equal to zero, possibly because the coe¢ cient on DE t is not precisely estimated. 30 For the reason described in footnote 27, we focus on the marginal e¤ect on the latent dependent variable (desired amount of dividend payments). 31 Similar results are obtained when we de…ne the dummy variable R ijct equal to one if the stock of retained earnings scaled by sale is greater than the 75 percentile value in the previous year's sample, and when we de…ne R ijct as a continuous variable equal to the stock of retained earnings scaled by a¢ liate sales in the previous year.
not …nd an signi…cant e¤ect of dividend exemption on the typical a¢ liates, foreign a¢ liates that had retained large amounts of foreign pro…ts increased dividend payments more than other a¢ liates with the enactment of dividend exemption. In this sense, dividend exemption helped to ful…ll the main aim to stimulate dividend repatriations from foreign a¢ liates with a large stock of retained earnings in line with the expectation of the Japanese government.
On the other hand, we …nd no evidence that the responsiveness of dividend repatriations to foreign tax rates signi…cantly changed with the enactment of dividend exemption. The change in dividend payments was not associated with either the grossed-up tax rate di¤erence between Japan and foreign countries, or the withholding tax rates on dividends, which is inconsistent with our hypotheses H2 and H3. The Japanese government was concerned that adopting a territorial tax system may facilitate tax avoidance by multinational corporations shifting foreign income to low tax countries. Though it might take more time for companies to change their tax strategies in response to the tax reform, our results suggest that Japanese parent …rms did not immediately respond to dividend exemption by reallocating their foreign pro…ts to their foreign a¢ liates in low tax countries and increasing dividend repatriations by those a¢ liates in 2009, and thus may alleviate the concern of the Japanese government.
Robustness Tests and Alternative Speci…cations

Robustness Tests
In this section, we describe the results from various robustness tests to see how sensitive the above results are to di¤erent speci…cations. First, one possible concern about the results obtained in the previous sections is that, because the dividend payout capacity increases as the pro…ts of foreign subsidiaries increase, the signi…cant positive coe¢ cient on (R ijct DE t ) may be caused by an increase in the pro…tability of foreign subsidiaries with a large stock of retained earnings in 2009 and may not be due to the enactment of dividend exemption. To investigate this issue, we estimate the same regression equations as those in Tables 6  and 8 replacing the dependent variable by pre-tax pro…t scaled by a¢ liate sales. 32 While the coe¢ cient on DE t is not signi…cant and the coe¢ cient on R ijct is signi…cantly positive, the coe¢ cient on (R ijct DE t ) is then estimated to be no longer signi…cantly positive. This implies that the positive e¤ect of dividend exemption on dividend payments by foreign a¢ liates with a large stock of retained earnings is not passed through the improvement of the pro…tability of foreign subsidiaries with large retained earnings. We also estimate the regression equations using dividend payments scaled by pre-tax pro…t as a dependent variable and then …nd similar results to those in Tables 6 and 8 . This implies that foreign a¢ liates that had accumulated large foreign pro…ts increased dividend payments relative to its pre-tax pro…t in 2009 than other a¢ liates. Second, there may be a concern about division bias when we used dividend payments scaled by a¢ liate sales. Though the scaling variable is used to control for the subsidiary size, the dependent variable could be overly a¤ected by the year-to-year ‡uctuation of subsidiary sales, which may bias the estimated coe¢ cients. To explore this issue, we try scaling dividend payments by a¢ liate capital and estimating the same regression equations in Tables 6 and  8 by replacing the dependent variable by dividend payments scaled by capital. We then obtain similar results to those in Tables 6 and 8 . Therefore, noting that we also obtained the similar results when scaling dividends by pre-tax pro…t, we conclude that our results do not depend on whether to scale dividend payments by a¢ liate sales, pre-tax pro…t, or capital, which alleviates the concern about division bias.
Alternative Speci…cations with One Summary Tax Price
The estimation equations in Section 5 and 6 focus on capturing the change in the dividend repatriation behavior of Japanese-owned foreign subsidiaries by the dummy variable DE t and its interaction terms with foreign tax rates including the tax rate di¤erential between Japan and foreign countries (P ijct ), the withholding tax rates, and the statutory tax rates of host countries. We employed that speci…cation because our three hypotheses feature the changes in the sensitiveness of dividend repatriations to each of those foreign tax rates separately. However, as an alternative speci…cation, we could use one tax price summarizing the tax costs of dividend repatriations over 2007-2009 and see the responsiveness of dividend payments by foreign a¢ liates to the summary tax variable.
Assuming parent …rm j is in excess limit position, dividend exemption changed the tax cost of paying a dollar of dividends by foreign a¢ liate i in country c in 2009 from P ijc to (0:05 H + w D c ), where P ijc is the grossed-up di¤erence between Japan's statutory tax rate and the average subsidiary tax rate, H is the Japanese statutory corporate tax rate, and w D c is the withholding tax rate on dividends in country c. Thus the tax price on dividends over the data period can be summarized by
We estimate a version of the regression equations in Tables 6 and 8 including Tax Price ijct as an independent variables instead of using P ijct , w D c , and the interaction terms of DE t with other tax variables as independent variables. Tables 9 and 10 present the estimation results. Speci…cations (1) and (2) in Table 9 and the speci…cation (1) in Table 10 do not include DE t or its interaction terms with Tax Price ijct and R ijct . In these speci…cation, the signi…cantly negative coe¢ cient on Tax Price ijct suggests that the tax price on dividends discouraged dividend payments by Japanese multinationals over the entire data period.
=== Tables 9 and 10 === Speci…cations (3) and (4) in Table 9 and speci…cations (2)- (4) include DE t or its interaction terms with Tax Price ijct and R ijct as independent variables. The coe¢ cients on (DE t Tax Price ijct ) and (R ijct DE t Tax Price ijct ) are intended to capture the possible change in the responsiveness of dividend payments to the tax price in 2009. The coe¢ cients on DE t and (R ijct DE t ) are intended to capture the change in the level of dividend payments that is not related to the tax price in 2009. In speci…cation (4) in Table 9 and speci…cations (3) and (4) in Table 10 , the estimated coe¢ cient on DE t is negative. The coe¢ cient on (R ijct DE t ) is estimated to be signi…cantly positive in both speci…cations (3) and (4) in Table 10 . This suggests that while the typical a¢ liate decreased dividend payments in 2009, foreign a¢ liates that had a large retained earnings in 2008 increased dividend payments more than other a¢ liates with the enactment of dividend exemption and supports the robustness of the result in the previous section.
On the other hand, the estimated coe¢ cients on (DE t Tax Price ijct ) and (R ijct DE t Tax Price ijct ) is more di¢ cult to interpret because as the signs of these coe¢ cients change depending on whether to include DE t and (R ijct DE t ) as in speci…cation (4) in Tables 9 and  10 . While the coe¢ cient on Tax Price ijct is signi…cantly negative in all speci…cations, the sum of the coe¢ cient on Tax Price ijct and that on (DE t Tax Price ijct ) is 0.002 in speci…ca-tion (4) in Table 9 and the sum of the coe¢ cients on Tax Price ijct and its interaction terms with DE t and R ijct is also close to zero in speci…cations (2) and (4) in Table 10 . This may suggest that dividend payments became less sensitive to the tax price on dividends in 2009.
Conclusion
Japan introduced a permanent dividend exemption and moved to a territorial tax system in April 2009. We provide the …rst evidence about the behavioral response of foreign a¢ liates to the transition from a worldwide income tax system to a territorial tax system by studying Japan's dividend exemption. We …nd no evidence that the dividend exemption system stimulated dividend repatriations of the typical foreign a¢ liate that had paid no dividends under the worldwide tax system. However, the response of Japanese multinationals to dividend exemption was heterogeneous. Foreign a¢ liates that had retained large amounts of pro…ts were more responsive to the tax system change and started to pay more dividends than other a¢ liates in 2009. Therefore, dividend exemption helped to ful…ll the main aim to stimulate dividend repatriations from foreign a¢ liates with a large stock of retained earnings in line with the expectation of the Japanese government. On the other hand, we …nd no evidence that the responsiveness of dividend repatriations to foreign tax rates signi…cantly changed with the enactment of dividend exemption. The change in dividend payments was not associated with either the grossed-up tax rate di¤erence between Japan and foreign countries, or the withholding tax rates on dividends in 2009.
Our results may be informative for international corporate tax policy design in the United States. The Japanese worldwide tax system was similar to that of the United States, and the two countries have the highest corporate tax rates among OECD countries. However, the response of U.S. multinationals to dividend exemption could be somewhat di¤erent than that of Japanese multinationals for two reasons.
First, the impact of a dividend exemption on pro…t repatriations should crucially depend on the proportion of parent …rms in excess credit positions. Because foreign a¢ liates owned by parent …rms in excess credit would not face repatriation taxes (P ijct ) in home countries under the worldwide tax system, their repatriation behavior would not change substantially with the introduction of dividend exemption. Thus, if the proportion of Japanese multinationals in excess credit positions under the worldwide tax system was larger than that of U.S.-owned a¢ liates, the impact of dividend exemption in Japan would be smaller than in the United States. In addition, unlike that of the United States, the Japanese worldwide tax system did not require multinational …rms to calculate their foreign tax credits for foreign taxes on passive and active incomes separately. Thus, it might have been easier for Japanese multinationals to avoid the repatriation taxes by using excess foreign tax credits (cross-crediting) under the worldwide tax system than for U.S. multinationals.
Second, unlike the United States, Japan has tax-sparing agreements with several countries (Bangladesh, Brazil, China, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Thailand, and Zambia as of June 2012) in its tax treaties. Foreign a¢ liates in those countries may be less responsive to dividend exemption because the tax sparing provisions could substantially decrease their repatriation tax costs under the worldwide tax system for some of those foreign a¢ liates. Therefore, the response of U.S. multinationals to dividend exemption could be di¤erent (possibly larger) than that of Japanese multinationals. However, even given those considerations, our …ndings about the heterogeneous response depending on the stock of retained earnings are worth noting.
In conclusion, there are several research issues for the future that are worth mentioning. First, from the policy point of view, it important to analyze a general equilibrium e¤ect of dividend exemption, focusing on the potential trade-o¤ between the decline in tax revenues and the increases in dividend payments; however this issue is beyond the scope of this paper. 33 Second, a focus on foreign direct investment would be an important extension.
Under the new exemption system, because foreign dividends are exempt from home taxation and Japanese multinationals must pay corporate income taxes only to host country governments, they should be likely to have more incentive to invest in low-tax countries than they did before April 2009. Because foreign direct investment is conducted from mid-to longterm perspectives, to address these issues, it is imperative that the quality and coverage of …rm-a¢ liate-level panel data be improved and expanded.
Appendix
In this appendix, we theoretically examine how the Hartman result changes when …rms expect a decrease in repatriation tax rates on dividends using a simple three-period model based on Grubert (1998) and Altshuler and Grubert (2003) . The model consists of three periods, 0, 1, and 2. Periods 0 and 1 are the periods before the introduction of the dividend exemption system, and period 2 is the period under the new exemption system. Denote the repatriation tax rates on dividends in period t by D t for t = 0; 1; 2. As we will show in the next subsection, dividend exemption decreases the repatriation tax rates on dividends. Thus we assume that
Consider a parent …rm in Japan and its "mature" foreign a¢ liate located in country c that has enough retained earnings (R) to …nance its investment. The foreign a¢ liate produces output using capital with the production function f (K), where K is capital input. The production function is strictly concave, strictly increasing, continuous, and continuously di¤erentiable, and satis…es the Inada condition:
For simplicity, we assume that capital does not depreciate over time.
At the end of period 0, the a¢ liate determines the amount of retained earnings out of the stock of retained earnings R for reinvestment in period 1, denoted by E. The rest of earnings (R E) is repatriated to the parent by dividends. At the beginning of period 1, investment takes place using capital input E and the pro…t from the investment comes at the end of period 1. At the end of period 1, the a¢ liate repatriates D 1 of the after-tax a¢ liate income, retaining R to reinvest in period 2. Denote the statutory tax rate of country c by c . Then D 1 can be written as D 1 = ((1 c )f (E) R). In period 2, the a¢ liate produces using (E + R) of capital and repatriates the entire net wealth to the parent …rm in Japan at the end of the period by dividends. Thus D 2 = (1 c )f (E + R) + E + R. The parent …rm determines E and R so as to maximize the present value of the net cash ‡ows:
where r is the real interest rate. The …rst order conditions for the maximization problem with respect to E and R are
These two conditions can be rewritten as
Equation (A-1) implies that the initial investment E does not depend on the repatriation tax rates. If the repatriation tax rate is constant over all the periods (
, R also does not depend on the repatriation tax rate because equation (A-2) then yields (1 c )f 0 (E+R) = r. Therefore, as Hartman (1985) shows, if
, the repatriation tax rate a¤ects neither foreign investment nor dividend payments by the subsidiary.
However, if 
Equation (A-3) says that when the repatriation tax rate in period 1 is higher given the repatriation tax rate in the next period, the a¢ liate increases dividend payments in period 2. Equation (A-4) says that when the repatriation tax rate decreases in period 2, the a¢ liate will retain more pro…ts in period 1 by decreasing dividend payments in that period and will increase them in period 2.
These results imply that Japan's foreign dividend exemption will stimulate dividend repatriations in two ways. Dividend exemption decreases the repatriation tax rate, and as a result, Japanese multinationals face the same lowered repatriation tax rate after the introduction of the dividend exemption system ( . As we will see in the next subsection, Japanese multinational …rms had faced di¤erent repatriation tax rates under the worldwide tax system ( D 1 ) depending on their foreign tax credit positions and the corporate tax policies of host countries (e.g., corporate tax rates and bases). Therefore, as equation (A-3) implies, foreign a¢ liates that had faced higher repatriation tax rates will pay out more dividends under the new exemption system. Exchange rate between Japanese yen and local currency, which is normalized to one in 2005 Parent Net Pro…t/Assets Parent net pro…t scaled by total assets Parent Total Debt/Assets Parent total debt (total current and …xed liabilities) scaled by total assets Retained Earning/Sales Subsidiary retained earnings at the end of the account year scaled by sales Pre-tax Pro…t/Sales Subsidiary pretax pro…t scaled by sales The subscripts i, j, c, and t intend to indicate the subsidiary, its parent …rm, the country where the subsidiary is located, and the year, respectively. 
